Budanov, Umerov, and Syrsky? Why are there talks about potential dismissals within the military leadership?
Why have discussions about the resignations of Budanov, Umerov, and Syrsky emerged, and are these discussions truly behind us? This is explored in the material by military-political observer Ulyana Bezpal'ko from RBK-Ukraine.
CONTENT:
In the second half of September, the information space—first in social networks, then in the media—saw the emergence of purported "announcements" regarding future changes in military leadership. According to various versions circulating in the media week after week, the heads of the Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) Kirill Budanov, Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov, and even Commander-in-Chief Alexander Syrsky could face dismissal.
It seems that this topic has somewhat faded into the background now. However, as eight anonymous sources from different military-political circles reported, rumors of these dismissals and changes did not arise without reason.
Is there a real possibility of Budanov's replacement?
At the beginning of last week, the President's Office published a photo from Volodymyr Zelensky's office during his meeting with the Minister of Defense and the head of HUR. The Office reported that they were discussing the plans of Russian troops on the front. This post was likely intended to dispel rumors and show that everyone continues to work in their positions.
However, several sources assert that discussions about a possible replacement for Kirill Budanov did not emerge without cause. According to them, a conflict has developed between the head of military intelligence and the head of the President's Office, Andriy Yermak, who is one of the supporters of his dismissal.
The latest wave of tension between Budanov and the Office began to build up this summer. According to RBK-Ukraine, initially, there were plans to remove military attachés and combat special units from HUR's subordination, numbering more than a dozen. Currently, the publication reports that there is talk of a certain reorganization of the military attaché apparatus, as a result of which intelligence should not lose its influence over this institution.
Last week, the president met with the Minister of Defense and the head of HUR (photo: Office of the President)
Another, more public event was the attempt to expand the negotiation group, which on behalf of the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (KSHVOV) is engaged in preparing exchanges.
Budanov has headed the Coordination Headquarters since mid-2022. De jure, it is an organ of the Cabinet of Ministers, which should include representatives from various structures. De facto, the activities of KSHVOV were mainly carried out under the auspices of HUR. In mid-August, there were intentions to include representatives from the SBU, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Commissioner for Human Rights in the negotiation group at the Coordination Headquarters. Furthermore, attempts were made to create something akin to a council or presidium at the headquarters, which would include representatives from those bodies already part of the Coordination Headquarters.
From the outside, all these movements appeared to be an attempt to sideline military intelligence or at least reduce its influence in exchange matters. However, as sources within the Defense Forces note, the role or activities of HUR have not changed in this regard.
"While some pondered what was happening with the Coordination Headquarters, privately, there were intentions to remove HUR from the list of those who could carry out long-range strikes on Russian territory. How are such operations planned? Coordinates, targets, and tasks are determined, and then the executor is assigned. It was suggested that such operations could be carried out by all other agencies except military intelligence, but this did not come to pass," one of RBK-Ukraine's sources explained.
Another story that was meant to cast a "shadow" over HUR involved events surrounding "Spetstechnoeksport" (STE). Since October, this state enterprise has been removed from the Main Intelligence Directorate and placed under the control of the Ministry of Defense. After the onset of the large-scale war, STE was bringing in weapons, equipment, and ammunition for the Defense Forces from abroad on behalf of the Defense Procurement Agency, including from countries that do not openly and directly cooperate with Ukraine.
The Ministry explained this reorganization by stating that they faced "barriers" during the internal audit of STE, while the company was found to have issues with receivables, which became known to the media. Due to several factors, the company could not timely deliver certain contracted weapons and thus accumulated debts to the Ministry of Defense. The ministry plans to conduct an audit of "Spetstechnoeksport's" activities and may consider its liquidation.
However, other sources in the military-political leadership insist that the STE situation is unrelated to the tension regarding Budanov and "merely coincided in timing." "It was not sudden; months were needed to decide on transferring STE directly to the Ministry of Defense," one source added.
At the same time, several informed sources from RBK-Ukraine claim that Budanov has gained "enemies" in other agencies, particularly within the SBU. However, according to them, his relationship with the head of the special service, Vasyl Maliuk, is "completely normal and constructive."
The media also reported on a conflict between Budanov and Commander-in-Chief Syrsky, due to which the head of military intelligence allegedly was not involved in operations in the Kursk region. However, the publication's sources deny both claims.
"Between the General Staff and HUR, there is rather a healthy competition regarding intelligence data. Sometimes HUR provides its information, while the General Staff offers its own, obtained from the Armed Forces units on the battlefield. There are instances where their data and forecasts based on those data do not align. It happens that they do not favor the General Staff. However, there is no actual conflict there," explains one informed source.
Currently, several unrelated sources within the publication assert that the clouds over the head of HUR have cleared. However, none of them can predict how long this will last.
"The president is being convinced that Budanov will supposedly embark on a separate political endeavor. However, he has a normal relationship with Zelensky. Budanov has direct communication with him and with foreign partners, which does not sit well with everyone. The Office sees his recognition, media activity, and trust ratings. Although it is precisely Budanov's recognition and ratings that currently work in his favor. The Office fears what his dismissal without obvious complaints about his work could lead to," one source asserts. Ultimately, these reasons were echoed by four other RBK-Ukraine sources with varying formulations.
Some of them believe that attempts to "shake" Budanov's position will continue, and it is quite possible that the question of his resignation may resurface before the end of this year. Additionally, according to the publication, a candidate has been eyed on Bankova who could take Budanov's place if he is replaced—current head of the Foreign Intelligence Service Oleg Ivashchenko, who reportedly has good relations with Syrsky and Deputy Head of the Office Roman Mashovets. Budanov himself, according to one version, may be offered a position similar to Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Intelligence: to keep him in orbit while simultaneously stripping him of real levers of influence and media presence.
Could Umerov and Syrsky also be replaced?
Simultaneously with discussions about Budanov's future, rumors emerged on social media suggesting that Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov may also be sent into resignation. About two weeks prior, there was information, confirmed by RBK-Ukraine sources, that almost all deputy ministers could be replaced soon. Ultimately, Umerov only dismissed three of his deputies and the state secretary but remained in his position.
As the publication's sources note, the threat of the minister's dismissal is not currently on the table. Three sources explained that there are no significant complaints about Umerov's work, nor is there anyone to replace him.
Neither Umerov nor Syrsky are threatened with dismissal in the near future (photo: Facebook of Rustem Umerov)
"Perhaps the key complaint from Bankova could be that after a year in office, Umerov has not fully met the expectations placed on him by the Office. Although he has no conflicts with either the president or Yermak. There are also no contenders for his replacement," one source says.
At the discussion level in the Office, the candidacies of Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov and First Deputy Minister of Defense Ivan Havryliuk were considered. However, sources close to the vice prime minister assert that he is not ready to move to another position as he has many tasks in his current role. According to the publication, there have been no discussions regarding a change of position for Havry