A game without rules: How the West is losing ground to Russia and China in the global power struggle.

To understand why the West is losing to Russia and other authoritarian states in the struggle for global influence, the failure of the "de-escalation policy," and the overall degradation of the democratic system, read the column by Milan Lelich, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of RBC-Ukraine.

The resolution of the Syrian civil war – or its interim phase – occurred largely without the involvement of the United States. If America played any role, it was purely secondary. It would have been extremely difficult to imagine such significant global affairs, especially in the Middle East, being conducted without active American engagement. However, it was impossible to completely exclude them – for instance, the U.S. acted as mediators in the ceasefire talks between the Kurds and the pro-Turkish opposition in the north of the country – but this is a more localized, non-strategic issue.

Of course, the U.S. is currently experiencing a unique transitional phase – Joe Biden is almost no longer president, while Donald Trump is not yet president. Even before this, the role of the U.S. as "state #1" or "global policeman" was more of a stereotype than a reflection of reality. Both Democrats and Republicans have contributed to this perception.

Decisions made by the White House to provide Ukraine with modern weaponry or to impose sectoral sanctions against Russia may be viewed by members of Biden's team as the pinnacle of courage and determination. Yet, from an external perspective (not to mention from Ukraine itself), Washington's policy in recent years, especially after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, appears rather sluggish and unconvincing. This includes both the analytical groundwork for decisions and their practical implementation.

The catastrophic withdrawal of Americans from Afghanistan in 2021 was based on data from the nominally most powerful intelligence and analytical services in the world, which predicted that the government in Kabul could hold off the advancing Taliban for a considerable time. In reality, it collapsed even faster than Assad's regime in Syria.

1Evacuation from Taliban-occupied Afghanistan (photo: Getty Images)

In contrast, Ukraine represented a significant miscalculation – Kyiv not only did not capitulate within 24/48/72 hours but has been resisting the so-called "second army in the world" for almost three years (and this assessment of the aggressor's strength turned out to be yet another misjudgment).

The U.S. has failed to adapt to this new reality, despite having all their intelligence and analysts. Even now, at the end of 2024, the term "escalation" continues to echo across the ocean, which, for Ukrainians living in this escalation, elicits only irony.

The American "team of de-escalators" has completely failed in practice regarding global affairs, yet they either do not want or cannot acknowledge this. A simple comparison of the general state of the world a few years ago and now – when conflicts rage almost everywhere – makes this evident. And in places where there is currently no conflict, tensions could ignite at any moment.

The comical attempts to "avoid escalation" stem from a general strategic misunderstanding by the West regarding the essence of the main disruptor of global peace – Russia. Trying to measure an aggressor state with the same yardstick used for Germany, France, or Poland is doomed to failure. The foundation of the Western decision-making process in any transactions with other parties – the desire for win-win situations – does not apply to Russia at all.

2One of the main proponents of the "de-escalation policy" in the White House, Jake Sullivan (photo: Getty Images)

In Moscow, the global order is traditionally viewed either as a zero-sum game ("for us to win, you must lose") or as a lose-lose strategy ("let us lose a lot, but you will lose even more"). The only countries in the West that understand this are on the eastern flank of the EU/NATO, which has experienced this approach firsthand.

Additionally, there is a failure to comprehend that external aggression and the seizure of new spheres of influence are the very foundation of Russian policy throughout history, not a temporary deviation under Putin. Consequently, all the pathetic hopes for a "normal Russia," which the West holds for the few and fragmented Russian opposition figures it has sheltered, are also a losing strategy from the outset. This, in turn, is fueled by a permanent fear of the possible collapse of Russia, a concern that is just as misplaced as it was over thirty years ago when the Soviet Union was disintegrating.

Thus, the global confrontation with autocratic or fundamentalist regimes is currently being lost by the West on points; fortunately, it has not yet reached a knockout. However, it might if the U.S. does not learn from its own mistakes. As long as they remain unlearned, this is most clearly evidenced by the situation in Ukraine. All the "avoidance of escalation" and various "red lines" have long discredited themselves as concepts, yet they continue to be stubbornly referenced.

Instead of adequately confronting the aggressor autocrats – the only language they understand – Washington and the European leaders looking to it largely continue to play at "appeasement." Israel, for example, has a good understanding of how anti-democratic systems operate, in contrast to the EU and the U.S., and acts without much ceremony to ensure its own security through forceful means, as the world is currently witnessing in post-Assad Syria.

In the role of someone who could potentially "give the autocrats a taste of their own medicine," one might consider Trump. However, during his first presidential term, he did not particularly demonstrate himself in this capacity. Moreover, it is evident that he holds a noticeably greater sympathy for "strong leaders," whom he associates with autocrats, than for professional European-liberal bureaucrats.

3Future U.S. President Donald Trump (photo: Getty Images)

Furthermore, Trump's declared isolationist approach and focus on addressing domestic American issues directly contradict the need to contain anti-democratic forces worldwide. In overseas media, this is even referred to as "the end of America's century" – a time when the U.S. undoubtedly played the leading role in global affairs. It is, of course, impossible for the U.S. to completely close itself off in its western hemisphere under Trump. This was unfeasible over a century ago when similar ideas enjoyed greater popularity, and since then, the level of globalization has increased exponentially. Trump has also outlined a circle of external enemies he intends to combat (of course, in his own way) – primarily China, and secondarily Iran.

The general inability of the West to resist anti-democratic countries and trends is compounded by the inherent properties of contemporary democracy as such: its bureaucratic complexity, vulnerability to manipulation of public opinion, and the necessity of seeking consensus solutions, which is often difficult, lengthy, and sometimes impossible.

Moreover, authoritarian leaders are free from the constant concerns that democratic leaders face – they do not have to think much about how to get re-elected. Ignoring the sentiments of their subjects is probably not possible, even for the Kremlin, but its leader is confident that he will rule for as many terms as he decides, and no "voters" will hinder him in this regard. In democracies, the situation is fundamentally different; as is well known, politicians begin to consider the next elections immediately after the previous ones.

And if Putin can tell Russians: "I need more missiles, so you all will eat less," and no one really protests – in Britain, France, or Germany, the country's leadership must spend a long time (and often unsuccessfully) explaining to their voters why an extra fraction of GDP should be directed to defense rather than to some social benefits.

Anti-democratic states like Russia have learned to exploit all these vulnerabilities effectively, employing a full arsenal of tactics – not only propaganda but also direct bribery of authorities and media in countries of immediate interest to them, along with various economic tools.

This is clearly visible in Georgia, where a fierce battle between the West and Russia is currently underway. Despite a bloody history of relations, trade turnover between Tbilisi and Moscow has increased several times over the past decade. As in the case of Ukraine, the West has primarily acted reactively and with significant delay regarding Georgia. Even though the current government’s clear tilt toward Moscow has been evident for a long time, Europe and the U.S. have yet to develop a coherent counter-strategy.

4Protests in Georgia (photo: Getty Images)

In contrast, a relatively successful example of self-defense by democracy can be seen in recent events in Romania. After detecting the evident Russian influence in the success of the right-wing anti-Western candidate, Kelin Georgescu, the country took the unprecedented step of completely canceling the results of the first round of presidential elections. It is unclear how much political logic and the desire of the Romanian establishment to remain in power played a role in this decision, and how much was genuine intent to protect young Romanian democracy, but here the anti-Western pro-Russian vector suffered an unexpected defeat. For now.

This case runs counter to the established trend of recent years – according to numerous annual