The Illusion of Security: Why the Budapest Memorandum Failed to Protect Ukraine from War.

Today marks exactly 30 years since the Budapest Memorandum, under which Ukraine renounced its nuclear weapons in exchange for guarantees of territorial integrity from Russia, the USA, and the UK. However, in 2014, Moscow occupied Crimea, instigated war in Donbas, and eight years later began a full-scale invasion. Why did the memorandum fail, and is it possible to restore Ukraine's nuclear status in this context? This is discussed in the RBK-Ukraine article.

Who and How Pressured Ukraine to Surrender Nuclear Weapons

After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine inherited one of the most powerful armies and the third-largest nuclear arsenal. This situation greatly concerned the collective West, led by the United States. In the early 1990s, Washington and Moscow rarely aligned in their views, yet both desired to see Ukraine as a non-nuclear state.

As a result, the young nation faced constant pressure to eliminate its warheads. As recalled by the first president, Leonid Kravchuk, the US threatened sanctions and total isolation.

"Both Clinton and Vice President Gore said, if Ukraine acts otherwise, there will be, literally, 'economic sanctions and not just economic ones'. Could Ukraine, just being born, immediately start by becoming a threat to Europe and the world?" he stated in one interview.

Thus, on January 14, 1994, a joint statement was issued by Kravchuk, US President Bill Clinton, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin regarding the removal of strategic nuclear weapons and Moscow's fundamental agreement to some compensation.

Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, and Leonid Kravchuk after the joint statement in Moscow, 1994 (photo clintonlibrary.gov)

Less than a year later, on December 5, 1994, Ukraine's next president, Leonid Kuchma, signed the Memorandum on Security Guarantees in Budapest (Hungary) concerning Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Later, France and China also joined the Budapest Memorandum.

According to the document, Kyiv renounced its nuclear arsenal, while the US, Russia, and the UK committed to respecting Ukraine's independence and borders, refraining from the use of force (or even threats of force), and from economic pressure, meaning everything that could violate its sovereignty.

It was already noted by the second president, Leonid Kuchma, back in 2009 that the Budapest Memorandum does not contain real security guarantees.

"The then-president of France, François Mitterrand, said: 'Son, don't believe this document; you'll be deceived,'" Kuchma recounted at an international conference in Jerusalem.

Ukraine fulfilled its obligations and officially relinquished its status as a nuclear state on June 2, 1996, giving up an estimated 1,500 to 2,100 strategic and 2,800 to 4,800 tactical warheads.

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Ukrainian and American officials near the 43rd Rocket Army silo, Pervomaisk, 1994 (photo dtra.mil)

"In my opinion, this was one of the most remarkable stories of deception in modern human history. A document was signed with you that actually did not exist. In other words, there was an illusion – something was signed that did not work. And everyone who signed it understood that," said Mykhailo Podolyak, an advisor to the head of the President's Office, in an interview with RBK-Ukraine.

Yuriy Kostenko, the Minister of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety in the 1990s, believes the question should be posed correctly: "It should not be 'Could Ukraine have kept its nuclear weapons?' but rather 'Why did it receive virtually nothing in return?'

"As soon as the last train carrying nuclear warheads left Ukraine in June 1996, we became uninteresting to the West. What could be taken from Ukraine? The economy operated within the Russian coordinate system, and all proposals from the US were rejected," he stated in a conversation with the publication.

According to him, the US proposed an alternative disarmament option: to convert highly enriched uranium and plutonium into fuel for nuclear power plants. The American side was willing to finance this project. Had this happened, he estimates, the fuel would have lasted until today.

Why the Budapest Memorandum Does Not Work

In the 1990s, it seemed that no one would attack Ukraine. Even Vladimir Putin emphasized several times after coming to power that he respected the borders of the neighboring state. "We do not want to take Crimea; that would be absolute foolishness. If we start taking something from someone, something will be taken from us," he stated.

Later, he reiterated that Crimea is not a disputed territory and that Russia had long recognized Ukraine's borders. "The question of any such objectives for Russia, I believe, carries a provocative tone," Putin added.

However, as soon as Ukraine sought to break free from the shadow of the so-called "older brother," the rhetoric changed. The signatories of the Budapest Memorandum did not defend Ukraine after the occupation of Crimea or after the war in Donbas began.

During the full-scale invasion by Russia, former US President Bill Clinton apologized for pressuring Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons.

"I feel personally involved in the fact that I forced (Ukrainians – ed.) to renounce their nuclear weapons. And none of them believe that Russia would have taken this (invasion – ed.) if Ukraine still had its weapons," he admitted.

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Bill Clinton acknowledged during the full-scale war that he pressured Ukraine regarding the renunciation of nuclear weapons (photo GettyImages)

Western guarantors were either unable or unwilling to fully protect Ukraine, supposedly due to disagreements over the understanding of the content and meaning of the Budapest Memorandum. While the Ukrainian version refers to "Memorandum on Security Guarantees," the English version uses "Memorandum on Assurances of Security." On the other hand, the signatures of the leaders of the US and the UK are under both the Ukrainian and Russian copies, where "guarantees" and "guarantors" are respectively stated.

The document did not require ratification in parliaments but remained a full-fledged international treaty. However, it lacked a mechanism for ensuring security. In practice, all tools were reduced to "consultations," in which Russia, for obvious reasons, was not inclined to participate.

"This is not a question of nuclear weapons or strategic bomber aviation; it's a question of what was agreed upon, what instruments were in place to fulfill those agreements. Not only are there no specific guarantees outlined for what to do in various situations, but moreover, one of the guarantors started a war," Podolyak commented to RBK-Ukraine.

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This is what one of the pages of the Budapest Memorandum looks like (photo RBK-Ukraine)

As early as 2016, Kravchuk was convinced that Western countries were simply afraid of war with Russia.

"Russia is waging aggression against Ukraine. All these countries should unite and stop Russia. Here I am sitting instead of Obama (the then US president – ed.) and thinking: 'The Third World War is inevitable'... In this case, the priority is no longer territories or enhancing the sovereignty of one country, but strengthening humanity," he stated.

Can Ukraine Regain Its Nuclear Status

It is logical that opinions on whether to remain a non-nuclear country, especially after other signatories disregarded the Budapest Memorandum, were only a matter of time.

Just days before the full-scale Russian invasion, at the Munich Security Conference, President Volodymyr Zelensky reminded the West of the security guarantees received for renouncing the nuclear arsenal.

"We do not have that weapon, and we do not have security either. We also lack parts of our country's territories... The Budapest Memorandum is not working, and all package solutions have been called into question," he stated.

In the autumn of 2024, at a press conference in Brussels, he provided details of a conversation with Donald Trump, who was then a candidate for the US presidency. In particular, he mentioned that the