Why didn’t the Red Army capture Berlin in the winter of 1945, despite having the capability to do so?

Eight decades ago, on January 14, 1945, the 1st Belorussian Front, commanded by Georgy Zhukov, began its participation in the Vistula-Oder operation. Although it commenced two days later than the 1st Ukrainian Front to the south, it advanced much more quickly, resulting in a deeper incursion.

So far that Vasily Chuikov, who commanded the 8th Guards Army in the direction of the main assault, stated in 1964: “Our troops… could have continued their offensive towards Berlin in early February, advancing another eighty to one hundred kilometers and completing this gigantic operation by capturing the German capital in one go.”

Zhukov reacted strongly: “V. I. Chuikov framed his memories primarily to glorify himself and discredit my actions as the representative of the Stavka VGK and commander of the 1st Belorussian Front during the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations.”

At public debates on this issue, many generals from the 1st Belorussian Front sharply opposed Chuikov's theses, but he remained unimpressed and stated at the end of the debates that he was still confident in his correctness.

In the 21st century, historian Isaev assessed Chuikov's statements similarly negatively: the Soviet troops “hardly would have reached the city and raised the flag over the Reichstag. This is practically certain.”

Zhukov's argumentation, along with that of his generals and Isaev, appears reasonable: the 1st Belorussian Front, if it had advanced towards Berlin, faced the threat of an attack from the north by the German grouping in Pomerania. What good is a march on the enemy's capital if you end up encircled at its walls, just as the Red Army did in 1920 near Warsaw?

However, by the end of this text, the reader will likely side with Chuikov and consider the “higher headquarters” to be responsible for a series of very serious mistakes. Let's try to understand why.

Why did a chance to capture Berlin arise during the Vistula-Oder operation?

At first glance, the Vistula-Oder operation (January 12 – February 3, 1945) is a model for any deep operation: even in 2025, there are no examples of such scale, speed, and number of participants. Zhukov's troops began their advance from the Vistula on January 14, and by January 31, they were on the western bank of the Oder. Five hundred kilometers in 17 days against the strongest army of the surrounding world is a significant achievement.

The brilliance of Zhukov's leadership is evident when comparing his successes with the neighboring 1st Ukrainian Front under Koniev. Zhukov's front, with 1.12 million men in the operation, lost 17 thousand killed — 1.55 percent. Koniev's front, with 1.08 million men, lost 26 thousand, or 2.42 percent. Meanwhile, Zhukov advanced 500 kilometers in 19 days of participation in the operation, while Koniev managed only 400 kilometers in 22 days. The reasons for Zhukov's successes, as one reads the memoirs of those who worked with him, are quite understandable:

“...we conducted constant and purposeful reconnaissance. In no previous operation of the [Great Patriotic War] had it been organized so fundamentally, I would say. The Front Commander G. K. Zhukov paid exceptional attention to it; he demanded that we uncover the nature and system of the enemy's defenses to the full tactical depth…”

His front knew exactly when the enemy was withdrawing shifts to the rear and struck at the time of day when there were maximum personnel in the trenches. Participants recall the first trenches from which no shots were fired: as Soviet infantry jumped over them, they saw only German corpses. This is hardly surprising, as the Red Army significantly outnumbered the Wehrmacht in artillery pieces, even though German industry was much stronger than the Soviet one.

The neighboring fronts did not fare as well: they conducted reconnaissance of the first line less thoroughly, and in several cases their artillery preparation fell on almost empty trenches, barely affecting the depth.

Another important distinguishing feature of Zhukov's leadership was his direction for tank commanders to bypass the enemy's resistance nodes, even if there were tens of thousands of soldiers there, and to continue moving forward without fear for their flanks. The bypassed resistance nodes were then eliminated by infantry armies. Ivan Koniev's front saw such bypassing happen somewhat less frequently, and often tankers wasted time clearing the enemy from cities—transport hubs.

However, this speed also sparked the aforementioned intense debates: could the Red Army not only reach the Oder in January 1945 but also capture Berlin by mid-February?

The faster the troops advance in a deep operation, the lower their losses. After all, the enemy, throwing its reserves to the front, cannot occupy defensive positions in time at a high pace of advance. The advancing tank wedges catch the reserves in the open field, shooting them on the move, crushing them under tracks, scattering them. As a result, those who advance faster encounter less resistance: the enemy's reserves are not infinite.

Chuikov, and Zhukov after him, noted in their memoirs that as a result of all this, by early February 1945, the enemy had very few forces remaining in the Berlin direction: capturing the city was possible. Zhukov directly states: on January 26 of that year, he submitted a proposal to the Stavka to strike at Berlin without pause. And that decision was approved. And until the very first days of February, everything was proceeding in that direction. On February 4, Zhukov issued instructions to the troops:

“The enemy does not have any significant counterstrike groupings in front of the 1st Belorussian Front at the moment. The enemy also does not have a continuous front of defense... The tasks of the front troops... are to make a rapid push to capture Berlin on February 15-16.”

Thus, Chuikov and Zhukov thought alike until the very end of the Vistula-Oder operation: it should not remain merely a Vistula-Oder operation; it should become a Vistula-Elbe operation. Berlin had to be taken.

Why did the Red Army not capture Berlin in February 1945: Zhukov's version and that of everyone else

On February 4, a turning point occurred in the sentiments of Zhukov and most Soviet generals. Georgy Konstantinovich explains it simply: the enemy created a strike grouping on the northern, exposed flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, in Pomerania, intending to strike from there and cut off the Soviet wedge extending toward Berlin.

This sounds threatening, but there is a problem. Post-war historians know well that the German grouping in Pomerania consisted of about 30 divisions (in equivalent), and frankly, several of them had been severely battered. Even with all the rear troops, this amounted to around 400 thousand men, fewer than a thousand tanks, and some of them were only pulled to this direction by the Germans in the spring, not February.

Meanwhile, the Soviet troops in the Vistula-Oder operation numbered two million men and seven thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, the majority of which were under Zhukov. It was more than realistic to shield against a northern strike with a thousand tanks and 300 thousand men. Moreover, part of the 2nd Belorussian Front under Rokossovsky also exerted, albeit moderate, pressure on the German forces in Pomerania. For the assault on Berlin, where in February 1945 there were almost no forces, Zhukov still could have allocated thousands of tanks and hundreds of thousands of men. So why didn't he do that?

The answer to this question is not found in his memoirs. And soon we will understand why.

Hammering screws with a hammer

The reasons for Zhukov's unusual restraint in February 1945 can be inferred by looking at what was happening on the footholds of his front beyond the Oder, 70 kilometers from Berlin. And what was happening there was approximately as follows. The enemy initially pounded away with artillery and swarms of aircraft for an hour—Germans made five thousand sorties here in a couple of days at the beginning of February—resulting in only one gun left from the anti-tank battery. And that one had a total of 13 shells. The “gun commander” pondered for a long time before each shot: is it worth it? If you miss, you'll be shooting at tanks with a pistol afterward.

Questions arise naturally. Fine, let’s assume that Soviet aviation in 1945 wasn't very effective against the Germans; this material explained why in detail.